Abstract: In a recurring game, a stage game is played sequentially by dierent groups of players. Each group receives publicly available information about the play of earlier groups. Not knowing the population distribution of player-types (representing individual preferences and behavior), society members start with a prior probability distribution over a set of possible type-distributions. Late groups update their beliefs by considering the public information regarding the play of earlier groups. We study the limit beliefs and play of late groups and the relationships to the true (realized) type-distribution and equilibria of the true Bayesian stage game.
Introduction
Notions of repeated games are useful for modelling strategic dynamic interaction in economics, political, and other social sciences. They also serve as experimental tools where convergence properties of various learning and evolutionary processes can be studied.
It is worthwhile to distinguish between two t ypes of repetition. The rst is repeated interaction among a xed group of players, for example rms engaged in ongoing oligopolistic competition. Formal models of repeated games describe such i n teraction and there is a large literature on this topic. (We refer the reader to Hart (1992, 1994) for suveys and references.) A second type of repeated interaction, introduced formally as recurring games in this paper, involves dierent players at each time. In a recurring game, as in a repeated game, a stage game is repeatedly played, but each stage is played by a new group of players. The repetition is important because each group of players may observe relevant information about the play of earlier groups. Recurring games capture the evolution of social behavior in multigenerational games, as well as interaction that occurs frequently in an existing society. F or example, most of the real estate transactions which occur each y ear involve dierent participants and can naturally be modeled as a recurring game. Similarly, the numerous applications of a particular auction procedure at dierent times and locations constitute a recurring game. Like repeated games, recurring games are applicable to a wide variety of problems of practical interest, and they also provide a wonderful laboratory for theories of learning and evolution.
The well established subject of repeated games with incomplete information, dating back to Aumann and Maschler (1967) (see Aumann and Maschler (1995) for an updated survey), deals with equilibrium play and individual learning of unknown opponent t ypes in repeated interaction among a xed group of players. The current paper studies a parallel question for social learning in recurring games. Our subject is the equilibrium play o f a recurring game in a society that does not know the distribution according to which player types are recurringly drawn for stage games. We refer to such games as uncertain recurring Bayesian games.
Starting with a prior over a set of possible type-distributions, we study conditions under which play converges to approximate equilibrium play of the static, unknown Bayesian stage game, and also identify interesting situations where such convergence fails. The positive 1 results presented here serve to encourage the use of Harsanyi (1967) Bayesian games by illustrating that type-distributions in a society can be learned. The negative results, on the other hand, are disturbing since they occur even when we start at an equilibrium of the uncertain recurring game.
In addition to Bayesian equilibrium, this paper is closely related to several other active areas of game theory and economic research. First are the subjects of learning and evolution where versions of repeated and recurring games have been used to study a lare number of interesting dynamics. The important contributions to this literature are too numerous to list here, but such examples include: Nash (1950) and Aumann and Maschler (1967) , as well as more recent w ork by F udenberg and Kreps (1988) , Jordan (1991) , Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) , Young (1993) , Fudenberg and Levine (1993) , Kalai and Lehrer (1993) (see Marimon (1995) for an overview). Second, our work is also related to the literature on imperfect monitoring as in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986) and Lehrer (1989) .
Of these literatures, the works that are closest in spirit to the approach taken here are Jordan (1991) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) . Jordan (1991) studied a semi{rational repeated game Bayesian learning process that leads players' expectations in the long run to a Nash equilibrium, and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) studied a rational learning process that leads players in a repeated game in the long run to Nash equilibrium play. Our work is built on the same mathematical foundation of Bayesian updating and convergence of beliefs and is also derived from martingale convergence{type results. However, our work diers signicantly in the types of conclusions reached regarding convergence to various forms of equilibrium play, and the type of applications addressed.
To understand some of these dierences, it is useful to note some overall dierences between learning in recurring games and learning in repeated games. In a repeated game, for instance between a wife and a husband or a parent and a child, players have the time to learn to best respond to the actual players they face and their chosen strategies. On the other hand, in a recurring game, for example recurring single exchanges between pairs of buyers and sellers, such opportunities are not available. Thus, recurring game players who study the past plays of earlier groups can at most learn the distribution of strategies in the population of opponents, but not the actual strategy of their realized opponents. So, in general, convergence in repeated games may lead to Nash equilibrium play while convergence in recurring games may lead to Bayesian equilibrium play. This might b e considered \bad news." 1 There are also several pieces of \good news" as one changes from repeated games to recurring ones. The fact that recurring game players are disjoint across stages leads, under natural conditions, to convergence to trembling hand perfect equilibrium, and not just to Nash equilibrium as obtained in the earlier literature. Small uncertainty in players' beliefs about the actions of other players serve as a natural proxy for the trembles in Selten's (1975) denition of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Such convergence does not require that any trembles or non-equilibrium actions ever be taken; simply that players start with beliefs that do not rule out those actions. We should emphasize that this result is unique to the recurring setting and is not true in repeated settings.
Other good news from the recurring setting is that long run learning does not require that players live forever as it does in a repeated game. Instead, only sucient cumulative social experience must survive with time. This means that one does not have t o b e a s concerned with the speed of convergence in recurring games, as one would in repeated games. Furthermore, the imposition on players' rationality is less severe in a recurring game. In a repeated game a player must solve an innite horizon dynamic optimization problem in addition to Bayesian learning. In a recurring game, the player's horizon can be very short, signicantly simplifying the optimization problem. For instance, if the stage game requires only a single choice of action by a player, then there is no incentive t o experiment and the behavior is simply myopic. 2 While the above m y opic phenomenon makes the recurring analysis simpler, it can also create drastic welfare dierences between the results of learning in recurring games versus 1 Of course, the news is bad only to the extent that one wants players to play Nash equilibrium. There are games for which players are better o in ignorance, i.e., for which all Bayesian equilibrium outcomes Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
2 Jordan (1991) considers a model where repeated game players act myopically. We could map that into the recurring game setup here by modeling his long-lived myopic players by recurring rational players. To capture the fact that players in his model are long lived one would consider a recurring game where the type-generating distribution is degenerate: that is, it chooses the same type in each stage. In the uncertain recurring version, players not knowing this distribution update their beliefs over it. Our model diers from Jordan's not only in that it admits other distributions and obtains results concerning Bayesian equilibrium, but also in that we illustrate conditions that lead to equilibrium play, rather than to equilibrium beliefs. However, our approach uses a countability assumption that Jordan does without. 3 learning in repeated games. Examples in this paper show that individual incentives not to experiment can lead to signicant social welfare losses that may require social intervention, such as armative action.
Indeed, the type of distributions that lead to failures of social learning in our examples are reminiscent of the literature on herding and informational cascades (e.g., Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welch (1992) ). Most of the games in that literature are recurring games, and the situations where they illustrate social ineciencies are ones where our general sucient conditions for convergence to the correct equilibrium are not met.
Another important issue that arises in recurring games is imperfect monitoring. In repeated games, as in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, (1986) and Lehrer (1989) , imperfect monitoring refers to the fact that players do not fully observe their opponents' actions. In recurring games there are aditional monitoring imperfections. Players from current or past stages of the game may know signicantly more than outside observers and future players who are only exposed to public signals from each stage. For this reason, the perceived social explanation for what is going on, may dier from the perspective of insiders who actually play the game.
In addition to the specialization to recurring games, the current paper also develops some general results and techniques regarding rational learning. First, as already mentioned, in contrast to the previous literature which obtained convergence to Nash equilibrium, we illustrate sucient conditions for convergence to trembling hand perfect (Bayesian) equilibrium. Second, a simple technique of representing players enables us to incorporate into the model players who do not learn at all, or who follow other methods of learning. One application of this technique is to examine the behavior of rational players in the presence of boundedly rational players. This is in the spirit of the analysis of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) .
An outline of the remaining sections of this paper is as follows. Consider the members of a population facing the option of taking on a certain task, e.g., attending law s c hool. For the purpose of this example, divide the population into two types, those who would succeed at the task and those who would fail. An individual who succeeds receives a payo of 1, while an individual who undertakes the task and fails has a payo of -2. Not taking on the task results in a payo of 0 for either type.
Without knowing his or her own type 3 a member of the population decides whether to take on the task based on the type distribution in the population. For example, if the distribution of types in the population, , is such that :8 of the population would succeed, then the Bayesian equilibrium (optimal decision) relative to this prior is for every individual to take on the task (:8 1 + : 2 ( 2) = :4 > 0).
If, however, members of the population are not sure about the distribution of types in the population, then less desirable social outcomes are possible. Suppose, for instance, that members of the population believe that it is equally likely that the population is described by , which is just the reverse of . That is, under , .8 of the population will fail, and the Bayesian equilibrium is to not take on the task.
Given the initial beliefs of the population that and are equally likely, the rst member of the population sees his or her chance of success as .5, and given the asymmetry in payos (i.e., the higher cost of failure) chooses not to undertake the task. This means that the second member of the population to make this decision will have the same available 3 This is easily t into a standard Bayesian model (as in Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( -1968 ) where players know their own type. This is described in Example 5. information and will also choose not to undertake the task, and so forth. If is the true distribution, then since no one takes on the task, no one plays the optimal strategy relative to . In this case, social learning fails, and indeed, this example violates the sucient conditions for social learning that are presented in Section 6 (and we examine this violation explicitly in Example 5).
While social policy is not the subject of this paper, notice that being aware of the failing of social learning above has important policy implications. The social equilibrium has valuable informational externalities that are not taken advantage of. That is, if early individuals could be convinced to take on the task, against their own perceived individual incentives, with high probability their success rate will be observed by later individuals who will update the beliefs to put higher probability on the optimistic prior when it is the true distribution. In that case, after a suciently long time the optimal strategy will be for members of the population to take on the task. In the language of social policy, there is a need for informational armative action that encourages the creation of early role models for the benet of the entire population.
As a further remark on armative action, note that the incentives must be such that they do not obscure the success of the individuals. For example, giving a population scholarships to law s c hool, but not changing the bar exam requirements, will serve this purpose (unless the exam requirements are to be permanently changed), as changing the requirements would produce less useful signals of the true distribution in the population.
The above example also illustrates clearly the dierence between a recurring game and a repeated game. If taking on the task was a repeated action available to a single patient individual, then it would pay that individual to experiment in early stages, because of the potential benet from learning his or her ability. Moreover, in the repeated game, the individual would learn about his or her own type, rather than the distribution of types in the population.
The previous example is reminiscent of some of the literature on social learning which explores herding phenomena, such as Banerjee (1992) , Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) , and Smith and Sorenson (1996) . (See also, Vives (1995) for a look at the externality and possible ineciencies which can arise in such examples.) These models, for instance that of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) , are examples of recurring games. Some of the provocative results in that literature relate to failed social learning. As we will show, the success of social learning relates to how m uch one can infer from observing the actions of previous agents. Our conditions on \privately observable payos" and \social implies private learning", dened shortly, relate to exactly this issue.
Let us now consider examples where play converges to be close to that of a Bayesian equilibrium where players know the distribution over types. Consider a private values, rst price sealed bid auction where a single object is sold to the highest bidder who pays the highest bid. If there is a tie, then one bidder with a highest bid is randomly selected. There are n bidders who each know their own value for the object, but are uncertain regarding the values that the other bidders place on the object. Suppose that bids and player valuations can take on a nite numb e r o f v alues.
If the distribution over the valuations is known, then we can identify Bayesian equilibrium strategies for the bidders. However, if players have only a prior over the distribution over valuations, their strategies may dier signicantly from the equilibrium strategies where the distribution is common knowledge.
What happens when the distribution over valuations is not known, but auctions are held recurringly and later players observe the bids in previous auctions? Later players will eventually learn to arbitrarily closely predict the distribution of bids that they will face in their auction (see Lemma 2, below). Thus, later players' actions are best responses to a distribution over other bids which is close to the actual distribution that they face. Notice that this does not necessarily imply that later players' actions are close to Bayesian equilibrium actions. Theorem 1 (below), shows that, in fact, the actions are also arbitrarily close to Bayesian equilibrium actions as if the distribution over valuations was commonly known. Therefore, play will eventually converge to that of a Bayesian equilibrium relative to the true underlying distribution of values.
The following example provides a very simple illustration of the idea behind the results related to convergence to undominated strategies and trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Consider a second price version of the auction described in Example 2, where a single object is sold to the highest bidder, who pays the second highest bid.
The`truthful' equilibrium, where each t ype bids his value, is the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies of this game. There are many other Bayesian equilibria of this game, for instance where player 1 always bids the highest amount permitted, and the other players stay out, bidding 0.
If the auction is played recurringly, natural assumptions on players' beliefs (for example assigning some positive probability t o t ypes who always bid truthfully) will have players persistently assign positive probabilities to all possible bids in all stages of the recurring game. In such situations, the unique best response is to bid truthfully in every stage, and the truthful equilibrium is the only possible limit.
We turn now to a formal presentation of the model and results.
Recurring Games
In a recurring (Bayesian) game, a stage game is played at each time t 2 f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; : : : g . New players are randomly drawn at each time t to play the stage game.
The stage game is a standard Bayesian game described by a list (N;fA i ; i ; u i g i 2 N ; ) with the following interpretations. The set N = f1; 2; : : : ; n gdescribes player roles with A i describing a nite set of (pure) actions available to a player in role i. A = A 1 A n describes feasible action combinations. The notation (A i ) denotes the mixed actions available to a player in role i. Each i is a countable set describing the possible types of a player in role i, and = 1 n describes proles of players' types. is a type generating distribution, which is a probability distribution dened over the proles of types in . Players' payos depend both on the vector of types and the chosen actions, and are represented by v on Neumann{Morgenstern utility functions, u i : A ! IR. Utilities are bounded: there exists a nite M 0 such that ju i (a; )j M for all a and .
To describe the recurring game, it is necessary to dene the way in which information becomes available from each stage. S is the countable set of possible publicly observed signals, with generic element s 2 S. Each v ector of stage game actions a 2 A and types 8 2 results in signals according to a probability distribution a; dened over S. A (social) history of length t, denoted h t , i s a v ector of publicly observed signals (s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s t ) 2S t , with S 0 = f;g denoting the empty history available to the rst group of players. H = s 0 [ ([ t S t ) denotes the set of all possible social histories.
A player in the recurring Bayesian game is denoted (i; t), representing the player of role i at time t. The recurring Bayesian game is thus described as follows.
Initially (after history ;), a vector of types 1 is randomly drawn according to . Each player (i; 1) is informed of his or her respective 1 i . Next, each player (i; 1) chooses an action a 1 i 2 A i . Players are paid u i (a 1 ; 1 ) and a signal s 1 is randomly drawn according to a 1 ; 1 . h 1 = ( s 1 ) becomes the publicly known social history (of length 1). In the second stage, a new vector of types, 2 , is is randomly drawn according to and each new player (i; 2) is informed of his or her respective t ype 2 i and chooses an action a 2 i 2 A i . Players are paid u i (a 2 ; 2 ) and a signal s 2 is randomly drawn according to a 2 ; 2 . The next social history is h 2 = ( s 1 ; s 2 ). The recurring game is dened inductively in the manner just described.
Strategies for players in a recurring game are represented by maps i : H i ! (A i ), which prescribe a mixture over the possible pure actions available to each player role as a function of the realized type in that player role and the observed history up to that stage. 4 The utility of a player in the recurring game for a given prole of strategies is dened to be the expected payo in the obvious way.
Uncertain Recurring Games
In a recurring game, if the players know the distribution according to which t ypes are drawn (), then the analysis is similar to the analysis of a static Bayesian game (as developed by Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( , 1968 ). It diers in that the history of previous stages may serve as a correlating device. If the players do not know the distribution , then history also plays an interesting role in learning. This is the focus of our analysis and is captured as follows.
Let M() be a countable set of probability distributions over . The uncertainty o f players is represented by , a probability distribution over M(). Prior to the start ofthe recurring game, a type generating distribution 2 M() is drawn according to the known distribution . The players then proceed to play the recurring game without any information about the realized . H o w ever, since players in each stage know , , 5 and see the history of previous play, o v er the course of the uncertain recurring game, they update according to the observed history of public signals and their own type.
The Probability Space
Before proceeding, it is helpful to dene a probability space which serves as the basis for an uncertain recurring game, given a strategy .
A fully described outcome (or state) is an innite sequence (; 1 ; a 1 ; s 1 ; 2 ; a 2 ; s 2 ; : : : ) in M() ( A S) 1 . To describe the probability distribution over outcomes, it suces to dene consistent probabilities over all initial segments of outcomes, and then P is the consistent extension to the set of all outcomes. 6 This is done inductively, b y letting P () = ( ) and P ( ; : : : ; s t ; t +1 ; a t +1 ; s t +1 ) = P ( ; : : : ; s t ) ( t +1 ) t+1 ;h t (a t+1 ) a t+1 ; t+1 (s t+1 ); where h t = ( s 1 ; : : : ; s t ).
The updating that player (i; t + 1) performs at the strategy prole after learning his own type is represented by the corresponding conditional probability.
Equilibrium in Uncertain Recurring Games
Given an uncertain recurring game, let us dene the expected utility of player i for a given prole of strategies , conditional on a history of signals through time t, h t , and player i's type t+1 i :
A prole of strategies forms an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium of the uncertain recurring game if, for all i, t, h t 2 S t , and i 2 i , V i (; h t ; i ) V i ( =e a h t ; i ; h t ; i )
for all e a h t ; i 2 A i , where =e a h t ; i is the prole of strategies which alters only by c hanging i to e a h t ; i after history h t for type i .
Social Learning
The rst lemma states that an outside observer who updates the prior distribution according to the observed histories will eventually stop learning, in the sense that the updated t = P (jh t ) converges to a limit distribution.
Lemma 1: Convergence of Beliefs. Consider an uncertain recurring game and a list of strategies . F or almost every h 2 S 1 there exists 1 2 M() such that P (jh t ) converges to 1 . 7 Since this paper makes no direct use of this lemma, we omit the proof. The convergence is a standard consequence of the martingale convergence theorem. The fact that the resulting limits, together, constitute a probability distribution is based on Lebesgue's bounded onvergence theorem and relies on the countability o f M ().
Although Lemma 1 establishes that an observer's beliefs will converge over time, it does not guarantee that they converge to the true distribution , o r e v en that the observer will be making correct predictions concerning forthcoming public signals. Later examples illustrate that players may actually fail to learn the real distribution. The following denition and lemma show that social observers will learn to predict correctly.
Denition: P merges 8 with P (j) if for P (j){almost every h there exists T such that P (s t+1 jh t ) i s {close 9 to P (s t+1 j;h t ) for all t T.
7 P (jh t ) converges to 1 at h if for any there exists T such that for all t > T sup 2M jP (jh t ) 1 ()j < .
The following result follows from Theorem 3 in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) . (See also Blackwell and Dubins (1962 The condition of privately observable payos states that the information contained in a signal, when coupled with the information of a player's type and action is sucient for that player to calculate his or her anticipated payo. This is almost a necessary condition for play to converge to resemble the play o f a B a y esian equilibrium where players know the type generating distribution. It is not quite necessary, because even in the absence of any information it is possible that best responses to the initial uncertainty happen to be the same as the best responses where players know the realized type generating distribution.
The privately observable payos condition is related to the observable payos condition in the literature. We h a v e added the word`privately' to emphasize that the signal alone is not enough to enable an observer to assign payos to players; but that a player who couples the signal with knowledge of his own action and type can determine his own payo.
Let us mention two situations where it is clear that payos are privately observable. If signals fully reveal the types and actions then clearly payos are privately observable. In the case where signals only reveal actions, if players' payos are private valued (i.e. depend only on actions and own type), then payos are privately observable.
One situation which is of particular interest is where the stage game itself is a nite extensive form game, and where a selected action consists of a pure strategy for the extensive form stage game. Here if players know their own payos from any combination of actions (i.e. payos are private valued), then if signals reveal the play path the condition is satised. 10 As can be easily seen, however, the privately observable payo condition is not enough to guarantee convergence to a Bayesian equilibrium relative to the true (realized) distribution. One immediate diculty is that this condition does not guarantee that players who know their payos on the positive probability paths also know their payos after hypothetical deviations. 11 But there is also a second and more subtle diculty. It is possible that one has learned to correctly predict signals unconditionally, but has not learned to correctly predict them given the additional information contained in one's own type. (This is illustrated in Example 6.) These two diculties are eliminated by the following condition.
Denition: Social learning implies private learning relative t o if for any > 0 there exists > 0 such that for any h 2 S 1 if P (s t+1 jh t ) i s {close to P (s t+1 j;h t ) for all t above some T, then P (s t+1 jh t ; t +1 i ; a i ) i s {close P (s t+1 j;h t ; t +1 i ; a i ) for all t > T , i , a i , and t+1 such that ( t+1 ) > 0. 12 The social learning implies private learning condition, is easily interpreted. It states that whenever an outside observer has learned to approximately predict the signals of the next stage as if he or she knew the true type generating distribution, then any inside observer (who has additional information i and a i ) will also be able to approximately predict the signals of the next stage as if he or she knew the true type generating distribution. Moreover, an insider can also approximate correctly the signals if he deviates from his prescribed strategy.
Even though social learning implies private learning is a condition stated on an equilibrium of the game, it is easy to identify conditions on the primitives of the game that guarantee its satisfaction, no matter what social equilibrium is played. This is the case, for example, if (i) types are independently drawn, i.e., each in the support of is the product of individual i 's and can be decomposed into a product of distributions across i 's, and (ii) signals enable perfect monitoring of the actions played. These conditions can be weakened in obvious ways. For example, (i) can be replaced by a distribution separation condition where coupled with dierent 's lead to dierent distributions over public signals.
While the above conditions may be familiar to researchers dealing with Bayesian games, we reiterate that the diculty illustrated in Example 6, where social learning has occurred and yet an insider's learning fails, is new and is worthy of further investigation.
Before we state Theorem 1, it is necessary to dene ideas of closeness to a Bayesian equilibrium relative t o a g i v en distribution. There are two conclusions to the theorem. Notice that a tight {equilibrium is stronger than a standard denition of {equilibrium (as in Radner (1980) ). The strenghening is that every action in the support of a player's strategy must be an {best response, rather than just the strategy itself being an {best 13 In the static Bayesian game there is no history, s o i : i ! (A i ). V i is the usual denition of expected utility, V i (; ; i ) = P ( j i ) P a ( a j ) u i ( a; ).
14 response. This strengthening rules out the possibility of placing small probabilities on actions that lead to relatively low p a y os. This stronger conclusion turns out to be important in obtaining the absorption in Example 9 (see the discussion following Theorem 1), for instance.
Denition: Given , a prole of strategies of the uncertain recurring game plays {like Choose the preceeding (6) to be 2M , and nd T accordingly. Thus, we know that jV i (a i ; ; ; h t ; i ) V i ( a i ; ; h t ; i ) j =2 for any t T and any a i . Since is an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium, and thus each a i 2 i ( i ; h t ) maximizes V i (a i ; ; h t ; i ), the above inequalities imply that each a i in the support of i ( i ; h t ) i s a n {best response relative t o .
Next, we show the second conclusion of the theorem: for any > 0 and almost every h (P {conditional on ) there exists T such that for each t T there exists a Bayesian equilibrium e of the static Bayesian game such that plays {like e . Suppose to the contrary that there exists a positive measure of h such that this does not hold. Pick a n y h such that (6) holds and does not play {like a n y B a y esian equilibria e of the static game, for innitely many t's. Index the i 's according to the positive i n tegers and then for the rst i nd a subsequence of the above t's such that i ( i ; h t ) converges to some i ( i ). Then proceed to do the same for each i in the ordering, taking a further subsequence each time.
Note that for some suciently large t along a particular subsequence, plays {like . (Take a n y nite set, with ( ) > 1 and then choose the subsequence corresponding to the last indexed i 2 i .) Thus, cannot be a Bayesian equilibrium relative t o . So, there exists i, i and a i 2 A i such that V i (a i ; ;; i ) V i (a i ;;; i ) for some > 0 and a i in the support of i ( i ) (where V i (a i ; ;; i ) = P s P ( s j ; i ; a i ) b u i ( a i ; i ; s ) and P (sj; i ; a i ) is a static probability measure). For any > 0 there is some suciently large T along a subsequence of the subsequence dened for i such that P (sj; i ; a i ) i s {close to P (sj;h t ; i ; a i ) for t T along this subsequence. [This further subsequence is found by taking a nite subset of i with large enough conditional probability (according to ) given i . I n tersect the subsequences corresponding to these types i and i so that i converges to i for this arbitrarily large ({conditional on i ) group of types i .] Thus, it follows that for suciently large t along this subsequence, V i (a i ; ; ; h t ; i ) V i ( a i ; ; ; h t ; i ) =2 for some a i in the support of i ( i ; h t ). (For large enough t on this subsequence, the support of i ( i ) is a subset of the support of i ( i ; h t ).) By our earlier argument (that for any > 0 there exists large enough T such that jV i (a i ; ; ; h t ; i ) V i ( a i ; ; h t ; i ) j< for any t T, i and a i ), it follows that V i (a i ; ; h t ; i )> V i ( a i ; ; h t ; i ) for some large enough t and a i in the support of i ( i ; h t ). This is a contradiction, since is an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium.
Notice that the static Bayesian equilibrium e to which play is close may v ary from one stage to the next. This is due to the fact that players may condition on history and thus may be playing correlated actions across time. A very simple example is one where players play one equilibrium in even periods and another in odd periods.
Theorem 1 states that after some time an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium is a tight { Bayesian equilibrium relative to the realized distribution, and that at each stage after that time it plays {like some Bayesian equilibrium relative to the realized distribution. Thus, every type is almost best responding relative to the true distribution and the aggregate actions play close to a true Bayesian equilibrium. Does this also mean that each t ype is almost playing the same as in some Bayesian equilibrium? Not necessarily, if there is an innite numb e r o f t ypes. This is illustrated in the following example where there are always types whose strategies are not close to any of their Bayesian equilibrium strategies. There are two players, N = f1; 2g, who each h a v e t w o pure actions (A i = fa i ; a i g). Player 2 has two possible types, 2 = f 2 ; 2 g, while player 1 has a countable set of types represented by 1 = f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; : : : g . Utility is private valued and there is perfect monitoring (signals reveal the actions chosen so that s = a). Distributions over types are independent. There is only one distribution of player 1 types, which is described by 1 ( 1 ) = ( 1 2 ) 1 . There are two distributions over player 2's types, 2 and 2 . These are such that 2 ( 2 ) = 1 = 2 = 2 ( 2 ), while 2 ( 2 ) = 1 = 4 and 2 ( 2 ) = 3 = 4. Players are uncertain and ( 1 ; 2 ) = 1 = 2 = ( 1 ; 2 ). In any uncertain Bayesian equilibrium of this uncertain recurring game, it is clear that player 2 will play the dominant strategy of a 2 if 2 and a 2 if 2 . Player 1's optimal strategy depends on the preceived (updated) distribution over types of player 2. After any history the updated will still place positive w eight on both distributions.
Suppose that the realized distribution is . Then after any history, a n y player 1 will update, but will still place some positive w eight o n . This means that there will exist some type 1 whose best response to the anticipated distribution of actions of player 2 is to play a 1 . This is also true of all types larger than 1 . As learning takes place, an arbitrarily large measure of of player 1's types will be choosing the correct best response of a 1 , but there will always remain some types choosing a 1 . Notice, however, that these remaining types are playing {best responses as required by the notion of tight {Bayesian equilibrium.
Example 4 depends on an innite numb e r o f t ypes. It is clear that if there are only a nite numb e r o f t ypes possible under , then if we take to be small enough all types would have to be playing strategies {close to the Bayesian equilibrium strategies.
The next two examples illustrate failures of convergence due to violations of the sucient conditions used in Theorem 1. There are two players, N = f1; 2g. Player 1 has two pure actions A 1 = fa 1 ; a 1 g and player 2 has only one action A 2 = fa 2 g. Player 1 has one possible type, 1 = f 1 g, while player 2 has two possible types, 2 = f 2 ; 2 ; g. There is perfect monitoring (signals reveal actions).
One distribution is such that ( 1 ; 2 ) = : 8, while another distribution is such that ( 1 ; 2 ) = : 2. Players are uncertain and () = 1 = 2 = ( ). Thus, player 1's initial uncertainty treats 2 and 2 as being equally likely.
In the following tables, the rst entry represents u 1 and the second u 2 . Consider constant strategies where player 1 always plays a 1 and player 2 always plays a 2 . The strategies form an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium of the above uncertain recurring game. Both and lead to the same distribution over actions under and so is never updated, even if the payos are revealed (but not if the type of player 2 becomes known). However, if player 1 knew that the true distribution was , then his or her unique best response would be a 1 .
Theorem 1 does not hold here because the social implies private learning condition does not hold. The diculty lies in the fact that player 2's type is important in determining player 1's payos, and can never be learned from a history of signals where player 1 only plays a 1 . As a result, player 1's assessment of his or her payo under the strategy a 1 can be wrong in a critical way.
This example, with a 1 and a 1 representing respectively, taking on and declining the task, is a description of the armative action example. Player 1's probability of success is uncertain and is modeled through a second player whose type may be thought o f a s being benevolent or not. A second way to model the armative action example is also by introducing a second player, but one who has only one type and two possible actions, a benevolent one and a nonbenevolent one. The same diculty with learning would arise.
The next example provides a stark illustration of the role of the social implies private learning condition. In this example players have private values, there is perfect monitoring, and society learns to perfectly predict future signals. However, players never learn which o f t w o coordination games they are playing. In this situation, players can correctly forecast play and signals unconditional on their types, but not conditional on their types. Again, the social implies private learning condition fails to hold. There are two players, N = f1; 2g, who each h a v e t w o pure actions, A i = fa i ; a i g. Each player has two possible types, i = f i ; i g. P a y os are listed in the above tables. There is perfect monitoring of actions. One distribution is such that players' types are perfectly correlated: ( 1 ; 2 ) = 1 = 2 = ( 1 ; 2 ). Another distribution, , has the opposite correlation structure: ( 1 ; 2 ) = ( 1 ; 2 ) = 1 = 2. Players are uncertain and () = 1 = 2 = ( ).
Consider constant strategies which are an even mixing over a 1 and a 1 , for each t ype of player 1 and every history. Let each t ype of player 2 play his or her strictly dominant action ( 2 plays a 2 , while 2 plays a 2 ). The strategies form an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium of the described recurring game. Both and lead to the same distribution over actions under and so is never updated. However, if player 1 knew which o f or was realized, then conditional on his or her type playe r 1 w ould also know the type of player 2 and thus what action playe r 2 w ould take. Thus, an even mixing is far from any B a y esian equilibrium strategy for player 1 when is known, and again the conclusion of Theorem 1 is violated.
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In the above example, there is perfect monitoring (signals could even show the mixture chosen), and players correctly predict public signals and strategies. However, social learning does not imply private learning. Types are correlated under the true distributions, and so the conditional expectation of player 2's action given player 1's type under the true distribution reveals 2's action. However, under the initial uncertainty there is no correlation of types, thus this information is lost, and given the mixed action of player 1, it is not retrievable.
Note that this example depends on the specic initial weights on the two distributions being 1/2. If it is not 1/2, then social learning will imply private learning. If for instance, it was 3/4 on , then the row player would want t o p l a y a 1 at 1 and a 1 at 1 , and the rst period signal would fully reveal whether the true distribution is or .
Learning to Play P erfectly
In situations where the sucient conditions for convergence to Bayesian equilibrium are met, it will actually be quite natural to expect convergence to a renement o f B a y esian equilibrium. For instance, if a player is never completely certain of the actions that the other players might c hoose, then that player should never play a w eakly dominated action. This means that convergence will actually be to an undominated Bayesian equilibrium of the static game. If, in addition, players types are drawn independently, then convergence will be to that of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Before presenting the next theorem, let us illustrate the intuition in an example. In the right hand matrix players 1 and 2 play a coordination game, while in the left hand matrix the payos are constant. Player 3 can thus play a 3 and hope that players 1 and 2 coordinate, or play a 3 and get a lower but sure payo.
There are continua of Nash equilibria to the above game, but only 3 trembling hand perfect equilibria ones: (a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ) ( a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ), and (1=2; 1=2; a 3 ), where the 1/2 indicates an even mixing over the two a v ailable actions. All the trembling hand perfect equilibria involve playe r 3 c hoosing a 3 , while there are Nash equilibria which i n v olve player 3 playing a 3 .
Consider a which results only in types with payos given by the above matrix.
However, allow to place weight on other distributions. We argue that if players have \full support subjective uncertainty," in that they never completely rule out the possibility that the other players will play a n y action combination, and if players types are not too strongly correlated in a specic way, then they could only learn to play a trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary, that over time players have learned to coordinate on, for instance, (a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ), which is a Nash equilibrium that is not trembling hand perfect. Thus, after some time they play close to (a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ), while each player still has beliefs that place some probability on the event that the other players use any other combination of actions. Player 1 still believes that there is a positive probability (however small) that 3 will play a 3 . As long as player 1 does not believe that this action of player 3 is highly correlated with player 2 playing a 2 , then it is better for 1 to play a 1 , rather than a 1 . This means that a 1 could not be a best response to player 1's beliefs and so (a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ) could not be the result of rational learning. It is clear that the role of the correlation in the beliefs of player 1 concerning the possible actions of players 2 and 3 is important in the above example. Given full support subjective uncertainty, this correlation determines whether convergence ends up being to a trembling hand perfect equilibrium, or to an undominated Bayesian equilibrium which might not be trembling hand perfect. Following some necessary denitions, we proceed to explore these issues in Theorems 2, 3, and in Example 8.
Denition: A distribution satises full support subjective uncertainty relative to a prole of strategies if P (a t+1 i jh t ; t i ) >0 for all i, t, a t+1 i , and almost every h t ; t i .
F ull support subjective uncertainty is satised, for instance, if players' beliefs allow for types who play mixed strategies at every stage; or if they believe that there are some types who may tremble at every stage. They need not actually face such t ypes, but simply believe We dene trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium according to Selten (1975) . 14 Let Int (A i ) denote the interior of (A i ).
Denition: is a trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the static Bayesian game If there are only a nite numb e r o f t ypes, then the mention of subsequences in the denition is inconsequential as we can intersect them to nd a single sequence, and the denition is equivalent to Selten's. Here we need to apply the denition to innite numbers of players (viewing each player as an agent, taking the agent normal form corresponding to the Bayesian game) which accounts for the need to make explicit use of subsequences. This denition allows us to capture situations such as Example 4, where players behavior converges at dierent rates.
Theorem 2: Learning To Play Trembling Hand Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Consider an uncertain recurring game such that u i is private valued, there is perfect monitoring (signals reveal actions), and is fully independent. If is an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium such that has full support subjective uncertainty relative t o , then for every > 0 and almost every ;hthere is a time T such that for each t T there exists a trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium e of the static Bayesian game (N;S;; ; f U i g ) such that plays {like e at stage t + 1 after history h t .
Proof: Fix any > 0 and such that () > 0. It is sucient to show that for almost every h (P{conditional on ) there is a time T such that for each t T there exists a trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium e of the static Bayesian game (N;A;; ; f u i g ) such that plays {like e Suppose that there exists a positive measure of h such that does not play {like a n y trembling hand perfect equilibrium of the stage game for an innite subsequence of t's. By Lemma 2 and perfect monitoring, we can nd an h such that for any , max a jP (ajh t ) P (aj;h t )j< for all t suciently large.
Index the i 's (according to the positive i n tegers) and then for the rst i nd a subsequence of the above t's such that i ( i ; h t ) converges to some i ( i ). Then proceed to do the same for each i in the ordering, taking a further subsequence each time. For any > 0 and suciently large t along a particular subsequence (similar to the one dened in the proof of Theorem 1), plays {like . T h us, cannot be a trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium relative t o .
W e n o w show that for each i and such that () > 0, there exists a subsequence of the t's such that each a i in the support of i ( i ) is a best response to P (a i jh t ) along that subsequence. For any i and such that () > 0, i ( i ; h t ) converges to i ( i ) along the subsequence of t's used in the denition of . T h us, given the nite action space, the support of i ( i ; h t ) contains the support of i ( i ) far enough along the subsequence. By full independence, private values, and the denition of uncertain Bayesian equilibrium we know that i ( i ; h t ) is a best response to P (a i jh t ). Thus, far enough along the subsequence, every a i in the support of i ( i ) is a best response to P (a i jh t ), which establishes our desired conclusion.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we construct a sequence e t such that e If the full independence condition in Theorem 2 (and corollary 2) is not satised, but there is full support subjective uncertainty, then play still converges to a renement o f Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Notice that if a player has uncertainty which allows for every action combination of the other players, then any best response to that player's beliefs about actions of other players has to be an undominated action. Thus, in situations where play converges to a Bayesian equilibrium play and there is full support subjective uncertainty, play will actually converge to an undominated Bayesian equilibrium. The following theorem is then an obvious consequence of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: Learning To Play Undominated Bayesian Equilibrium. Consider an uncertain recurring game with privately observable payos and an equilibrium such that social learning implies private learning. If has full support subjective uncertainty relative t o , then for every > 0 and almost every ;hthere is a time T, such that for P (a i jh t ); it is not adjusted any further. If the last a 0 i is the sequence is adjusted down, it must be that some previous a 00 i was such that P b t (a 00 i j) < P ( a 00 i jh t ); and the weight taken o action a 0 i can be transferred to a 00 i . in such a process, each action is adjusted downward at most once and when there are no actions to adjust downward the distributions must be equal. each t T there exists an undominated Bayesian equilibrium 16 e of the static Bayesian game (N;S;; ; f U i g )such that plays {like e at stage t + 1 after history h t . In the case of N = 2, the set of undominated Nash equilibria is the same as the set of trembling hand perfect equilibria (see van Damme (1987) ). It is not clear to what extent this result generalizes to Bayesian equilibrium. When N 3, however, this equivalence is broken and play does not necessarily converge to trembling hand perfect equilibrium play. This is illustrated in Example 8, below. Dierent players end up with dierent beliefs after observing the same history because conditioning on their types may lead them to dierent updating. Thus there is no common set of trembles justifying their actions. 17
Example 8.
There are three players whose payos are type independent. Actions and payos represented below. Playe r 1 c hooses a row, playe r 2 c hooses a column, and playe r 3 c hooses a matrix. Here all full information trembling hand perfect equilibria result in payos of 1,2,1. 18 The set of undominated Nash equilibria is larger, consisting of those where player 1 chooses any mixture of t and b, player 2 plays L, playe r 3 c hooses any mixture of l and r.
Consider, the undominated Nash equilibrium (b; L; l), which is not trembling hand perfect. Let us describe initial uncertainty which leads play to converge to b; L; l.
L is strictly dominant for 2, so any equilibrium will have 2 play L. T o justify b for player 1, she must believe that 2 will play R with at least twice as high a probability a s 2 16 Undominated is dened in the weak sense, where a i dominates a 0 i for i if it yields at least as high a payo (and sometimes higher) no matter the actions and the types of the other players (considering only those types which receives positive probability conditional on a player's type). 17 Similar considerations for dierent t ypes of the same player are what may break the equivalence between undominated Bayesian equilibrium and trembling hand perfect Bayesian equilibrium for N = 2 . 18 The perfect equilibria are any mixture between t and b coupled with L; r; and t; L coupled with any mixture of l and r.
will play M. T o justify l for player 3, he must believe that 2 will play R with at most half as high a probability as 2 will play M. 19 When is the true (realized) distribution only (b; L; l) will ever be played. Conditioning on histories, players will put weight increasingly on and decreasingly on the others, since no other distribution can lead to b; L; l. The weight on these other distributions will become arbitrarily small, but never disappear. Once player 1 sees that she is r 1 , she will update ruling out and b , but retaining e . This justies playing b. Similarly, once player 3 sees that he is r 3 , he will update ruling out e and b
, but retaining . This justies playing l.
Concluding Remarks
Bounded Rationality, Long Lived Players, and Stochastic Games.
Several easy technical modications enable one to extend the previous results on uncertain recurring games with rational players to signicantly richer models. Here, we briey describe such modications.
First, we describe the incorporation of \irrational" players. A player type following some irrational strategy can be made game{theoretically rational (Bayesian, expected utility maximizing) by modifying their utility function, as done for example in Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) and . We use an easier method (cheaper trick?) by making such players completely indierent, i.e., assigning them utility functions that have 0 p a y os regardless of the realized action and the types of the other players. Clearly, any behavior is a best response given such preferences. This approach is used in a recurring Battle of the Sexes' game, Example 9, below. In Jackson and Kalai (1995) , (1996) we used this technique to explore Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, Wilson (1982) results concerning chain stores and repeated prisoners' dilemmas in a recurring setting.
Example 9. Learning to Coordinate in the Presence of Boundedly Rational Players.
Consider a classic \Battle of the Sexes" game which is played recurringly. The payos to rational types are pictured below.
We rst identify the structure of an equilibrium where the population has a known proportion of rational players and a known proportion of boundedly rational players. It turns out that even in this context, the recurring structure has important implications. After having identied the structure of this equilibrium, we turn to an analysis of the situation where the rational players do not know the distribution of types in the population, but can learn through observations of the actions of past players.
Playing against a Known Distribution of Types Some players are \boundedly rational" and follow a naive best response strategy, nbr for short. Such a player matches the last period action of the opposite sex player. For example, an nbr player in the role of player 1 at time t + 1 adopts the action chosen by the player in the role of player 2 at time t. (Let rst period nbr players randomize equally over A and B.) Thus, an nbr player may be thought of as assuming that the other player will choose the same thing that his or her predecessor did. To formally t our model, we assign nbr types a constant utility of 0 so that their behavior is optimal.
Assume that in each period, when a new pair of players is randomly drawn independently of each other and past players, each member of the pair may be either Bayesian rational or an nbr type. Each player knows only his or her own type and the social history of the actions chosen by both players in each stage preceeding their stage.
Suppose that under the probability of a player being an nbr ty p e i s . 4 ( ( nbr) = : 4), and of being a rational ty p e i s . 6 ( ( rat) = : 6). The behavior of nbr players is easily predicted based on the play of the previous stage. We t h us compute the following Bayesian equilibrium strategies for the stage game at time t+1, where t 1, by examining strategies of rational players and requiring that they be best responses to the distribution over the strategies of other rational players and nbr players Case 1. Actions were (A,A) at time t.
The equilibrium actions at time t + 1 m ust be (A,A) with probability 1 .
Case 2. Actions were (B,B) at time t.
The equilibrium actions at time t + 1 m ust be (B,B) with probability 1 .
Case 3. Actions were (A,B) at time t.
The equilibrium actions at time t + 1 m ust be: (A,A) with probability . 6 .4, (B,B) with probability . 6 .4, (A,B) with probability . 6 .6, and (B,A) with probability . 4 .4.
Case 4. Actions were (B,A) at time t.
There are three dierent equilibria in this case.
In the rst equilibrium, the actions at time t + 1 are: (A,A) with probability .6 and (A,B) with probability .4.
In the second equilibrium, the actions at time t + 1 are: (B,B) with probability .6 and (A,B) with probability .4.
In the third equilibrium, the actions at time t + 1 are: (A,A) with probability 2/9, (B,B) with probability 2/9, (A,B) with probability 4/9, and (B,A) with probability 1/9.
Notice that the cases of playing (A,A) and (B,B) (that is, Cases 1 and 2 above) are absorbing when rational players follow their unique equilibrium strategies. Notice also that under recurring play, cases (A,B) and (B,A) must (with probability 1 ) e v entually lead to one of these absorbing cases. We can thus conclude that in an equilibrium play of the above 29 recurring game, where is known, players will converge to coordinate forever on (A,A) or (B,B).
Playing against an Unknown Distribution of Types What happens in the above situation if is not known to the players? Dierent equilibrium strategies may be realized, depending on the initial beliefs of the players concerning the relative likelihood of other type generating distributions. For example, players might believe that it is possible that an alternative describes the relative likelihood of rational and nbr types. More generally, players may allow for other type generating distributions which assign probabilities to other types of irrational players. For instance, they may b elieve that there are types of players who always play their favorite action, players who follow ctitious play, o r p l a y ers who best respond to what nbr's would do, etc.. Clearly, there is a large set of type generating distributions of which the above is only one.
Theorem 1, regarding convergence to Bayesian equilibrium, has strong implications here. Applied to this example it states that late players of the uncertain recurring game must play close to the Bayesian equilibrium strategies of their stage game, as if they knew the realized . Moreover, the conclusions of Theorem 1 are strong enough to preserve the absorbing properties of the plays (A,A) and (B,B). So even if the equilibrium players started with a highly diuse prior over the distribution of types in the population, if the realized is the one we described earlier, then play will be absorbed to a recurring play of either (A,A) or (B,B). This follows since in stages after (A,A) or (B,B) have been played, for small enough, since best responses are strict, -best responses require that rational players exactly follow the equilibrium strategies of (A,A) or (B,B), respectively.
The intuition behind the result is that late players will come to make arbitrarily close predictions as to the distribution over actions that their opponent will take. They may, in fact, never learn to correctly forecast their opponents' types. They will, however, be choosing actions which are almost best responses to the true distribution over actions. The stronger conclusion of Theorem 1 is that this combination of almost best responses is close t o a B a y esian equilibrium (something that is not generally true in games).
The uncertain recurring model is also easily modied to accomodate a recurring version of a stochastic game. Following Shapley (1953) , a stochastic n{person game consists of the usual individual sets of actions (A i ), but with individual utility functions u i;q which depend on a publicly known state q selected from a nite set of states Q. A xed, known collection of stochastic transition rules ( a ), with a 2 (Q), describe the movement among states according to the vector of actions chosen in the last stage. Thus, the game starts in an initial known state q 1 and players choose actions a 1 and receive p a y os u i;q 1 (a 1 ). Based on these actions, nature randomly chooses a new state q 2 according to a 1(q 2 ), which i s publicly announced before the second stage is played. This process is repeated.
A stochastic recurring game has only one modication. For each stage a new set of players is selected. To represent such a stochastic recurring game as a special case of the uncertain recurring games presented in this paper, model nature as an extra player, labeled 0, who has a at utility function. Formally, nature's actions are the set of states Q, and the utility of each player i 6 = 0, when nature chooses q and the remaining players choose a, u i (a; q), is simply dened to be the corresponding stochastic game utility u i;q (a). To endow the t + 1 stage players with the knowledge of which state nature will choose in stage t + 1, model the public signal coming out of stage t to be s t = ( a t ; q ) where q is randomly chosen according to a t , and then nature follows a strategy that plays q (from s t ) at time t + 1. Notice that this construction can be modied so that the signals only partly reveal q, and nature randomizes after observing the signal allows for substantially richer types of stochastic games with incomplete and imperfect information.
Finally, our recurring game results can be useful in modeling situations where some players are long lived. For instance, player 1 may be innitely lived with a type drawn during the rst period and xed forever, while the remaining players are new each period and have their types drawn in each period. Such a game can be modeled by replacing the innitely lived player 1 with a series of players (1; t ) who may be thought o f a s p l a y er 1's agents and who have at utility functions. Further, let the type generating distributions be such that a single type of player one is chosen with probability one, and incorporate into the original prior probability that the long lived player 1 is of the type described by . 20 The type of player 1 is then drawn at time 0 (when is drawn) and remains xed thereafter. To such a game we can apply our results to conclude that players 2 through n will learn to best respond, each in his or her own period t, to the strategy of player (1; t ). 20 For each there exists 1 such that if () > 0, then 1 = 1 .
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Then, we can conclude that whatever the type of the long lived player 1, late recurring short lived players will be approximately best responding to player 1's actual strategy. 21
Countability
We h a v e limited attention to a countable set of types and a countable set of distributions over those types. The method of proof that we h a v e used relies on these assumptions. Moreover, results by Jordan (1993) in the context of boundedly rational learning suggests that in general there may be diculties in learning to play mixed strategy equilibria when these assumptions are relaxed. Also, Nachbar (1995) raises interesting issues that relate to the richness of the type space. He shows that in a class of innitely repeated 2 by 2 games, if the sets of strategies that each player considers as plausible are suciently rich in a specic sense, then it is not possible to have beliefs over the plausible strategies such that players learn and have plausible strategies that best respond to those beliefs. To be careful, Nachbar considers repeated games and so his results cannot be applied to our model. However, there may be some analog of his results for recurring games, even though in a recurring game players care only about their own stages (thus substantially weakening the best response requirement) and learn a distribution over types rather than a specic type. Although, the incompatibility depends on the class of games considered and appropriateness of the diversity condition (which is not easy to guage), Nachbar's results suggest that there is still much to understand about the beliefs that are compatible with both learning and the existence of an equilibrium (best response behavior). At this time, we do not have m uch o f an idea of how our results extend when these assumptions are violated, but view it as an important issue for future research. 22 23 Existence 21 Player 1's best response to the short lived players, may i n v olve long term goals which are not captured in the period by period maximization of the recurring setup. Thus, a hybrid analysis of rational learning by players with lives of varying lengths is needed to fully address situations which are not strictly repeated, nor strictly recurring. 22 There are weaker sucient conditions for Lemma 2 to hold. We refer the reader to Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1994) and Sandroni (1995) for some recent w ork on this issue. 23 Since the original writing of this paper, new papers by N y arko (1996) and Jackson and Kalai (1996) have appeared that consider models of social learning with uncountable type spaces and oer insight on these questions.
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Finally, let us say something about the existence of an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium.If the set of types receiving positive probability given the initial uncertainty is nite (even if the support of over possible 's is not), then existence can be established using standard results. The rst stage is simply a nite Bayesian game (with a possibly inconsistent prior) for which an equilibrium exists. Using the rst stage equilibrium strategies for each type, the second period updating is then clearly dened and the existence of equilibrium strategies for the second period, conditional on any of the nite possible histories, can be established, and so on. If there is an innite set of possible types under the initial uncertainty, then the type-agent representation of the rst stage game will have an innite number of players, as possibly will subsequent stages. In such a case the existence of an uncertain Bayesian equilibrium will depend accordingly on the existence of an equilibrium in these corresponding static games.
